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MARTIN ALAN ROTHBLATT*

International Liability of
the United States for
Space Shuttle Operations
The Space Shuttle is the United States' largest current endeavor in space.
After examining the Space Shuttle itself, and the likelihood of accidents involving the Shuttles, this article will examine the international tort liability of
the United States for Space Shuttle operations' and will recommend improvements in the existing legal regime."
I. Overview of Space Shuttle Operations
The Space Shuttle, the world's first reusable spacecraft, heralds a new age
in space. Traditional launch systems are completely consumed in the process
of placing men or satellites in orbit, but the Space Shuttle is designed to
perform at least 100 launches of men and satellites into orbit before extensive
refurbishment is required. 3 The "primary design and operations goal for the

*Mr. Rothblatt is a student at UCLA Law School.
'The Shuttle will first enter space in 1980 for a series of tests. Regular operations should begin
later that year.
'A significant amount of public international space law to date has been written in the United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). By 1976, the United
Nations had generated four major treaties of space law: (1)
the Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, openedfor signatureJan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347,
610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force for the United States on Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter cited as
Outer Space Treaty); (2) the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts
and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature April 22, 1968, 19
U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 (entered into force for the United States on
Dec. 3, 1968) [hereinafter cited as Rescue Agreement]; (3) the Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, opened for signature March 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T.
2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762 (entered into force for the United States on Oct. 9, 1973); and, (4) the
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Jan.
14, 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8480 (entered into force for the United States Sept. 15, 1976).
'However, 50 missions may be a more realistic figure for some Shuttle systems. Av. WK. &
SPACE TECH., Nov. 8, 1976, at 65.
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Space Shuttle Program is to provide routine access to space."' For the next
decade, much of what this country and the rest of the Non-Communist world
sends into space will leave aboard the Space Shuttle.'
A. Nature of Shuttle Operations
The Space Shuttle is one component of NASA's Space Transportation
System. The purpose of the Space Transportation System is to reduce the cost
of placing objects in orbit around the earth. The Shuttle's primary function is
to place objects in low orbits of about 100-150 miles above the earth. The
remaining components of the Space Transporation System will move objects
from where the Shuttle placed them to higher orbits of up to 22,300 miles
above the earth, into heliocentric orbits or onto inter-planetary trajectories.
These other components are still being developed.'
The Shuttle is composed of three elements: Orbiter, External Tank and
Solid Rocket Boosters. The Orbiter, an aerospace vehicle' about the size of a
DC-9 jetliner, will carry into space a crew of as many as seven persons or a
payload of up to 65,000 pounds. During its missions of seven to thirty days,
the Orbiter may deploy, repair and retrieve satellites, operate space laboratories and telescopes, or ferry materials for the construction of permanent
space stations and other large space structures.8 The Orbiter will be launched
vertically, like a rocket, but will land as a glider on specially constructed
runways, using aerodynamic surfaces for terminal area approach controls.
Two weeks after the Orbiter returns from space it can be ready for another
launch.
Two Solid Rocket Boosters are ignited at launch to help provide the necessary thrust to lift the Orbiter out of the earth's atmosphere. About two minutes after launch, the expended Solid Rocket Boosters are jettisoned to fall
into the ocean. Tugboats pull the Solid Rocket Boosters back to shore. They
are then refurbished and readied for a later launch.
The External Tank is the fuel tank for the Orbiter's main rocket engines.
The Orbiter's three main rocket engines must also be ignited at launch to help
provide the necessary thrust to lift the Orbiter. About ten minutes after
launch the fuel in the External Tank will have been exhausted. By this time
the Orbiter will be approaching orbital velocity. The External Tank will be
released just prior to orbital entry, and allowed to "tumble," that is, to spin
end over end back into the atmosphere. Though most of it will burn up in the
'NASA, SPACE SHUTTLE vi (1976).
'The Soviet Union can also provide commercial launch services. Japan, the European Space
Agency, India and China are each developing and/or improving launch capabilities. Av. WK. &
SPACE TECH., Nov. 8, 1976, at 43.
'Other components are the Interim Upper Stage and the Space Tug. The Interim Upper Stage
should be ready by 1981; the Space Tug by 1983. See generally AMERICAN ASTRONAUTICAL
SOCIETY, SPACE SHUTTLE MISSIONS OF THE 80S,
571-865 (1977).
'For a discussion of the term "aerospace vehicle," see note 54 infra.
'Large space-based solar power or communication systems are the standard proferred examples of such "large space structures." Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 8, 1976, at 134.
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atmosphere, surviving fragments will land in the southern part of the Indian
or Pacific Oceans.
The four planned Space Shuttles, each composed of Orbiter, External
Tank, and Solid Rocket Boosters, are being developed by NASA and will be
the property of the United States Government.' However, there is, and there
will continue to be, an unprecedented amount of international involvement
in the construction and use of the Space Transportation System.'"
B. Likelihood of Damage or Injury
There are three phases to a Shuttle mission. Each suggests different possibilities for accidental damage or injury. During the Ascent Phase, the Shuttle
is either launched to the east from Cape Canaveral, Florida, or to the south
from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The Solid Rocket Boosters are
then jettisoned into the Atlantic or Pacific Ocean. The Ascent Phase concludes with the release of the External Tank for atmospheric burnup. The
Orbital Phase encompasses all Shuttle operations in orbit around the earth.
The Descent Phase involves the Shuttle reentering the atmosphere and, on a
nominal mission, gliding to an unpowered landing at either Cape Canaveral
or Vandenberg.
Dangers posed by the Ascent Phase are from a catastrophic failure of the
Shuttle itself, from the jettisoned Boosters, and from fragments of the External Tank which may survive atmospheric reentry. The External Tank separates from the Orbiter just prior to the achievement of desired orbital velocity
and altitude. The frictional forces of atmospheric reentry then incinerate the
massive 75,000 pound aluminum alloy Tank, and surviving Tank fragments
will be scattered over remote parts of the Indian or South Pacific Oceans."
Improper separation or turbulent and unpredictable atmospheric reentry
create a slight possibility of fragments falling on populated areas.' 2
'For a discussion of NASA's legal authority to-operate the Shuttle, see Mossinghoff Sloup,
Legal Issues Inherent in Space Shuttle Operations, 6 J. SPACE L. 47 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Mossinghoff Sloup]. NASA may turn the management of nearly all Shuttle operations over to
private contractors. Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., March 16, 1978 at 12. This will have no effect on
the international liability of the United States. See note 38 in fra.
"As NASA Administrator Fletcher states, "I want to emphasize that the Shuttle is the work of
many nations, and will provide opportunities for space participation for all the nations of the
world." L. NAPOLITANO, A NEw ERA INSPACE TRANsPORTATIoN 3 (1976). For a creative analysis
of the legal aspects of the Space lab/Space Shuttle Program. See also Bourely, The Legal Framework of the Spacelab/Space Shuttle Programs in Comparison with the Apollo/Soyuz Test Program, 4 J. SPACE L. 77 (1976). NASA already performs more launches for private industry and
foreign governments than it does for itself. HOSENBA.L, Space Law, Liability and Insurable
Risks, 12 FORUM 153 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hosenball]. See also note 44 infra.
IExperience has shown that man-made space objects which re-enter the atmosphere do not
completely burn up. See, e.g., Finch & Moore, The Cosmos 954 Incident and International
Space Law 65 A.B.A.J. 56 (1979); Dembling, Cosmos 954 and the Space Treaties, 6 J. SPACE L.
129 (1978).
"NASA plans to have the fragments fall over remote parts of international waters. It can be
estimated, with very high certainty, that the surviving fragments will fall somewhere in a 1700
mile-long corridor of the Indian Ocean. DOYLE, Reentering Space Objects: Facts and Fiction, 6
J. SPACE L. 107 (1978). Of the over 5,000 man made objects which have reentered the atmo-
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The Shuttle launch sequence includes abort plans in which the Boosters
and External Tank are prematurely jettisoned to allow the Orbiter to make an
emergency landing shortly after take-off.' 3 The launch ranges for the Shuttle
are over water, and the chances that a mishap during the Ascent Phase would
injure or cause damage on earth are extremely remote.
During the Orbital Phase, there is a danger of collision between the Orbiter, or an object the Orbiter places in orbit, and an object which is already in
orbit."' One accident has already occurred,' at a time when there were far
fewer man-made objects in space, and nearly all space activities occur within
certain preferred orbital paths in the sphere of space surrounding the earth. '
Computer models already reveal probabilities of collision between orbiting
space objects, over a ten-year period, of greater than ten percent for the most
highly utilized orbits." This probability could increase to twenty-eight percent by the end of the next decade." As one researcher commented, "it is not
a question of whether or not the probability of collisions will become unacceptably high, but rather when this will occur."' 9
Against these considerations one must weigh the Shuttle's ability to reduce
space collisions. The Orbiter can retrieve endangered satellites by placing
them in its cargo bay, or alter a satellite's orbit by attaching "rocket packs."
Furthermore, collisions can be anticipated with ground-based tracking systems and the Shuttle will make possible a virtually continuous manned presence in low earth orbit. These factors suggest that within the area of the
Orbiter's operations, any increased likelihood of collisions between space
sphere, there are only 47 reported incidents of fragments impacting on land or on ships at sea.
Hosenball, Space Law, Liability and Insurable Risks, 12 FORUM 153-54 (1976). In one of these
incidents, members of the Japanese delegation to the United Nations reported that fragments
from a device launched into outer space damaged a Japanese cargo boat and injured five sailors.
Diederiks-Verschoor, The Convention on InternationalLiability Caused by Space Objects, 15
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE

96 n.3 (1972).

In one very important respect it is quite inappropriate to compare surviving External Tank
fragments with meteorites or reentering man-made space objects. The External Tank, and its
fragments, will follow preplanned, non-orbital ballistic trajectories in their descent. Accidental
harm from objects on a ballistic trajectory planned to terminate in remote parts of an ocean is far
less likely than is harm from orbiting or deep space objects - which was shown above to be of
very rare occurrence.
"Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., June 3, 1974, at 14. NASA's Space Transportation System Traffic
Model estimates that for 560 planned Shuttle missions, 31 would have to be aborted. L. NAPOLITANO, A NEW ERA IN SPACE TRANSPORTATION 11 (1976).
"A recent accounting of trackable objects in earth orbit arrived at a total of 3,918. Hosenball,
supra note 10 at 154. It is estimated that there are two to three times this many non-trackable
orbiting objects, and, if space activities continue only at the pre-Shuttle era rate, the number of
objects in space will double in ten years. AMERICAN ASTRONAUTICAL SOCIETY, SPACE RESCUE
AND SAFETY 105, 133 (1975). The Shuttle, of course, will greatly increase the utilization of space.
'Two American satellites collided in 1965. S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, THE LAW RELATING TO
ACTIVITIES OF MAN IN SPACE 140 (1970) [hereinafter cited as LAY & TAUBENFELD].
"This is because certain orbital planes are especially useful. For example, most civil communication and meteorology satellites can be found in the geostationary orbit 22,300 miles above the
earth's equator.
"AMERICAN ASTRONAUTICAL SOCIETY, SPACE RESCUE AND SAFETY 136 (1975).
"Id. at 135.
"Id. at 180.
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objects occasioned by the Shuttle's increased use of space will be offset by the
Orbiter's abilities to prevent such collisions.
The Orbiter itself cannot prevent collisions in the highly utilized geostationary orbit. This orbit is far beyond the 100-150 mile orbit range of planned
Orbiter operations. But the Orbiter will serve as a platform from which satellites destined for geostationary orbit will be propelled.
Arguably, the Shuttle increases the probability of collision between geostationary satellites. However, the care taken in spacing these satellites, improvements in their guidance and control systems, and prospective Shuttlefacilitated manned capabilities in high-earth orbits pretty well counter this
argument. Hence the probable impact of the Shuttle will be a net reduction of
accidental damage or injury due to colliding or reentering space objects.
The Descent Phase concludes a Shuttle mission. In this phase the Orbiter
reenters the atmosphere, dissipates excess energy, and lands on a runway.
Flying a winged vehicle into the earth's atmosphere at a speed of Mach 25
presents formidable risks of loss of Orbiter control and collision with aircraft. Loss of control is the greater risk because the thirty-one minute reentry
approach to a runway 4,000 miles away involves, among many other things,
reentry temperatures which approach critical limits, steep banking maneuvers at hypersonic speeds and maneuvers during the two minutes when
Orbiter speed falls from Mach 5 to Mach 2 when handling and stability control problems can develop."0 The safety margins within which the descent
must be accomplished can fairly be characterized as always narrow and occasionally very narrow.
Loss of control will depend on the reliability of the Orbiter systems and the
responses of the pilots to particular dangers. The systems required for the
descent phase have back-ups, making systems failure very unlikely. Highly
advanced simulators capable of duplicating actual flight conditions, including convincing visual imagery, are providing shuttle pilots with the most
realistic and extensive training ever given astronauts. Even the most improbable combinations of systems failures are induced to provide Shuttle pilots
with experience and engineers with data on the spacecraft's reactions.
Thus, the very high, if not unprecedented, requirements for Shuttle system
reliability, coupled with comprehensive testing of these systems and extensive, realistic training of their human operators, makes accidental damage
due to loss of Shuttle control an unlikely event.
The Orbiter's reentry flight path will be predetermined, announced in advance and cleared of other aircraft.' Thus, damage during the Descent Phase
could only occur as a result of events such as an uncorrectable failure of
operating and reserve control systems or a failure to detect aircraft, visually
and electronically, in a pre-announced and cleared flight path. The chances
of these happening are exceedingly small.
"See

Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., May 14, 1979 at 38.
"The FAA has cleared airlane descent paths for the Shuttle. Mossinghoff Sloup, Supra note 9
at 51.
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In summary, there is very little likelihood of accidental injury or damage in
all three phases of a Shuttle mission. The chance of an accident on any given
Shuttle mission is also especially remote. The probability of an accident over
time, with Shuttle launches occurring every several days, year after year, 22 is
also quite remote as experience gained from actual Shuttle operations will be
used to reduce the possibilities of accidents. Given this assessment of the
probabilities of Shuttle-caused damage or injury, what is the United States
international liability if accidents do in fact occur from Space Shuttle Operations and damage is caused?
II. International Liability for Damages
Damage or injury caused by space vehicles has been of concern since the
beginning of the space age in 1957.3 This concern received formal recognition in 1971 with the United Nations General Assembly's passage of the
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob-

jects2' ("Liability Convention"). The Convention establishes legal bases and
procedures by which certain tort claims resulting from injury or damage
caused by a space object can be settled.2"
The tort covered by the Convention is "damage," defined as "loss of life,

personal injury or other impairment of health 26 or loss or damage to prop"See Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., May 26, 1975, at 49, where NASA plans for 60 missions a year
from 1984-1990 are discussed.
"For a review of United Nations' concern with this issue, see O.
LAW AND OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES

(1973); S.

LAY&

OGUNBANWO, INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 66-83

143-78 (1975); F. NozAmi, THE

H. TAUBENFELD, THE LAW RELATING TO THE ACTvrIEs OF MAN IN SPACE 136-

80 (1970); C. CHRISTOL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 352-80 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as CHRISTOL]; C. JENKS, SPACE LAW 283-90 (1965); Foster, The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, CANADIAN Y. B. INT'L L. 137 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Foster].
"The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, openedfor
signature March 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762 (entered into force for the United
States on Oct. 9, 1973) [hereinafter cited Liability Convention]. As of December 1, 1978, 71
States had signed the Convention, 34 had ratified it and 17 had acceded to its provisions.
"Another remedy available to a foreign plaintiff may be a products liability action against the
manufacturer of the Shuttle and its component parts. See Matte, Product Liability of the ManufacturerofSpace Objects, 2 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 375 (1977). Furthermore, manufacturers of
the Shuttle, if strictly liable, may not be allowed to share the immunity the government enjoys for
ultrahazardous activities. Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d. 774, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 128 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967). For a discussion of defendants other than the United States, see,

e.g., Dula, Management of Interparty and Third Party Liability for Routine Space Shuttle
Operations, 26 DRAKE L. REV. INS. L. ANN 741 (1977).
"For an exploration of whether this includes injury affecting mental or social well-being such
as loss of consortium, pain and suffering, mental anguish and loss of privacy, see S. GOROVE,
STUDIES IN SPACE LAW: ITS CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 124-25 [hereinafter cited as GOROVE]; It
is the view of a growing number of commentators that "moral" damages such as pain and
suffering are encompassed by this definition. However this position is certainly contestable.
Foster opines that "despite the problems involved in placing values on pain and suffering, and
loss of capacity to enjoy life, compensation may be awarded for such losses." However he
concedes national laws on the subject vary greatly, the matter did not receive much consideration
during negotiations over the Convention, and the Convention itself fails to expressly provide for
non-physical injuries. Foster, supra note 23, at 173. Matte has characterized the range of com-
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erty2" of states or of persons, natural or juridicial, or property of international intergovernmental organizations ..
."" However, the Convention
does not provide remedies for damage caused by a nation's space activities to
that nation's own residents.29 The Convention deals only with international
liability, that is, instances where one nation's space activities cause damage in
other countries or in nonterrestrial areas. Thus questions of the domestic

liability of the United States for damages caused at home are beyond the
scope of the Convention and this article."0
A. Provisions of the Convention
1. LIABLE PARTIES AND APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY

The liable party is called the "launching State," defined as a State which
launches, procures the launch or from whose territory is launched, the damage-causing space object. 3 This definition of "launching State" will create
liability in the United States for many years since the United States will be
launching the payload in its Shuttle, which will itself be launched from
American territory.
There will often be several parties liable because of the heavy international
use of the Shuttle,32 the Shuttle's capability of carrying several different payloads," and because a country which "procures" the launching of an object
pensable damages thusly: "loss of profits, interest, sentimental value, pain and suffering? It is
left open, to be decided in each case by the parties concerned, or, failing their agreement, by a
claims commission." N. M. MATTE, AEROSPACE LAW 157 (1977).
"'Loss or damage to property which directly results from an accident involving a space object
is clearly within the scope of the Convention. There is uncertainty as to whether the Convention
encompasses indirect or consequential damage, that is, damage which results only from the
consequences of an act. It is the position of the United States that damage "for which there is
only [a] hypothetical causal connection with a particular space activity" is not remunerable
under the Convention. STAFF REPORT, COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES, 92D
CONG., 2D. SESS, CONVENTION ON LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY SPACE OBJECTS, ANALYSIS

AND BACKGROUND DATA 24 (Comm. Print 1972).

:*Liability Convention, supra note 24, art. 1.
'Id. art. VII.
"Current federal law allows an American injured as a result of Space Shuttle operations to
either sue the United States in district court or to obtain relief directly from NASA. Under 42
U.S.C. § 2473(b) (1970), NASA has the power to pay claims for personal injury or property
damage, due to authorized NASA activities, which amount to no more than $5,000. NASA may
submit claims in excess of this amount to Congress for their consideration. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2473(b)(13) 1970.
A substantially damaged American claimant would thus have to file suit against NASA and/
or the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1346, 2671-80
(1970). All claims under the FTCA must first be submitted to the administrative agency claimant
feels is responsible for his injury. Only after the agency, e.g. NASA, rejects the claim, offers an
unsatisfactory settlement, or gives no response within six months, may the claimant file an action
in a U.S. district court. Pub. L. No. 89-506, § 2(a), 80 Stat. 306 (1966), amending FTCA 28
U.S.C. § 2675(a).
'Liability Convention, supra note 24, art. II.
"See note 10, supra.
"As many as five individual satellites can be placed in orbit during a single Shuttle mission.
NASA, SPACE SHUTTLE 10 (1976).
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is also a liable party.3 Under the Convention each nation participating in a
multi-national space venture is jointly and severally liable for damages."
This seemingly straightforward provision may yield bizarre results. For
example, NASA is actively soliciting small experimental packages to occupy
unused space in the Shuttle cargo bay. 6 Conceivably, a foreign scientist, as a
private individual or as an employee of his government, could pay a small fee
for the Shuttle to carry his experiment. Technically, he could be found to
have "procure(d) the launching of a space object." 37 This would make his
country38 a launching state, and hence jointly and severally liable for any
damage the Shuttle causes. 9
The Convention spreads liability broadly, but it may unfairly apportion
liability among jointly liable states. Injured parties may demand all their
compensation from any liable party,40 but a victim cannot, under the Convention, seek compensation from his own country. 4 ' Thus, if a Shuttle mission carrying an Indian 2 satellite caused damage to an American's house,
India and the United States would be launching states, 3 but only India would
be liable under the Convention. This result becomes especially unfair if the
damage had nothing to do with the Indian satellite. Fortunately, Article V of

the Liability Convention expressly permits indemnification arrangements between jointly liable States.
Also relevant is NASA's requirement that all Non-United States Government users of its launch services obtain a third party liability policy which
covers the United States Government as an additional insured. NASA's enviable safety record has been responsible for several reductions in the cost of
these policies."

"Liability Convention, supra note 24, art. 1.
"Id. art. V.
"Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 8, 1976, at 41.
"This is because "space object" is very loosely defined as including "component parts of a
space object .... " "Procures" is left entirely undefined. Liability convention, supra note 24,
art. I.
"Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2. (art. VI imposed responsibility on the State for its national
space activities, "whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by nongovernmental entities .... )
"Liability Convention, supra note 24, arts. 1,V.
"Id. art. V.
"Id. art. VII.
4'India, a nation with a very progressive space program, has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with NASA under which the Shuttle will launch and deploy the first generation of
India's multi-purpose geostationary satellites. SPACEFLIGHT, Jan. 1979, at 29.
"Because India procured the launching of a space object, and because the United States
launched the object.
"See Hosenball, Space Law, Liability and Insurable Risks, 12 FORUM 153, 154 (1976) and
Dula, Management of Interparty and Third-Party Liability for Routine Space Shuttle Operations, 26 DRAKE L.R. INs. L. ANN. 741 (1977) for further discussion of the availability and cost
of third-party liability coverage. See also Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 30, 1979, at 20-22 for
NASA's efforts to secure underwriting for space shuttle missions.
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THEORIES OF LIABILITY: NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY

Assuming the United States will usually be a liable party, what kind of
liability does this country face when it launches a Shuttle? The Convention
focuses on where the damage occurs to determine whether negligence or strict
liability applies.
If the damage occurs on the surface of the earth, or to aircraft in flight,
then strict liability exists."' If damage occurs in outer space, 6 liability is based
on fault." For example, during the Ascent Phase, the falling Rocket Boosters
and External Tank are possible sources of damage." ' If these components hit
a flying jet or a person's home, the United States is strictly liable for any
damage. On the other hand, a collision with another spacecraft during the
Orbital Phase,"' would occur in outer space, and the United States would be
liable only if it could be proved the Shuttle was being operated negligently. 0
Suppose the Shuttle places in orbit a satellite which later collides with a
Soviet spacecraft. Both objects de-orbit and disintegrate while falling
through the atmosphere with fragments of the collision causing damage to
residents of a third country on earth. The United States and the Soviet Union
are strictly liable to the injured parties on earth.5 ' However, because the
damage to the Soviet craft occurred in space, the United States will have to
compensate the Soviets for their damaged spacecraft only if the United States
negligently positioned its satellite. 2
The Convention does not provide such clear solutions to all complex space
accidents. Suppose the quite remote possibility of a collision between a spacecraft and the Shuttle as the spacecraft is leaving the atmosphere and the
Shuttle is reentering it. Since the Convention fails to define the boundary
between the earth's atmosphere and space," the appropriate theory of liabil-

"Liability Convention, supra note 24, art. 11.
"The question of where space begins has vexed lawmakers longer than even the liability
question. For reviews of several suggested definitions of where space begins, see Perek, Remarks
on Scientific Criteria For the Definition of Outer Space, 19th COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 185 (1977); OGUNBANWO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 50-

62 (1975); F. NOZARI, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 113-26 (1973); C. JENKS, SPACE LAW 189-91
(1965); A. HALEY, SPACE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 75-107 (1963); L. LIPSON & N. KATZENBACH,
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 11-18 (1961). See also REPORT OF THE FIFTY-THIRD CONFERENCE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION xxii (1969).

"Liability Convention, supra note 24, art. III.
"See notes 11-13 & accompanying text supra.
"9See notes 17-21 & accompanying text supra.
"See A. HALEY, SPACE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 241 (1963) for an exposition of the difficulties

of proving negligence in the operation of space vehicles.
"Although this scenario and conclusion is specified in article IV of the Liability Convention, it
may be deduced from the rule given in article 11.
"Liability Convention, supra note 24, art. IV. The launching State of each space vehicle also
apportions the compensation due the damaged party on earth in accordance with fault. If fault
cannot be established, the costs of compensation to the damaged party on earth is divided
equally among the space parties. However, the injured party on earth is free to seek the full

amount of compensation from one or both space parties. Id. art. IV.
"See note 46 supra.

480

INTERNATIONAL LA WYER

ity for the damage to the spacecraft and Shuttle is unclear." However, it is
clear that the United States and the spacecraft's State of registry would be
strictly liable for any damage on the earth's surface which resulted from the
collision.
3. PROCEDURE

Convention articles detail a two-step claims procedure. Only States may
present claims for damage suffered due to the space activities of another State
or States," and the first step is the submission of the claim through diplomatic channels, 56 to a launching State within one year following the damage
of identification of the liable launching state."
The second step occurs only if the claim is not settled through diplomatic
negotiations58 within one year after submission. 9 In this event, a Claims
Commission shall be established." The Commission will have three members; the claimant and launching State6 will each select one member and

"Since neither the spacecraft nor the Shuttle are "aircraft in flight," the absence of a boundary may not be that serious a problem. Strict liability applies only when persons on the surface of
the earth, or aircraft in flight, are injured by a space vehicle or a component thereof. Liability
Convention, art. II, note 24 supra. There is some doubt as to whether the Shuttle is an aircraft or
a spacecraft. An excellent article on the subject utilizes three sets of criteria (appearance, function and purpose) to evaluate the Shuttle. In both the Ascent and Orbital Phases, the Shuttle's
spacecraft nature dominates. In the Descent Phase, the spacecraft nature dominates at first and
then the aircraft nature becomes dominant as the Shuttle glides to a runway landing. The author
concluded that the Shuttle is really an "aerospace vehicle." However, this term has not received
international legal acceptance, so the Shuttle must be considered predominately a spacecraft
rather than an aircraft. See Sloup, A Guide for Space Lawyers to Understanding the NASA
Space Shuttle and the ESA Spacelab, ZEITSCHRIFT LUFT- UND WELTRAUMRECHT 196 (1977).

Sloup's conclusion, that the Shuttle should be considered a spacecraft for purposes of determining liability, was confirmed by NASA's Office of the General Counsel and by the Chief Counsel
of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The latter's opinion is reprinted in Mossinghoff
Sloup, supra note 9, Legal Issues Inherent in Space Shuttle Operations 6 J. SPACE L. 47, 65-66
(1978).
"States which may present claims are:
I. States which suffer damage, or whose natural or juridicial persons suffer damage;
2. States which suffer damage in their territory by any natural or juridicial persons;
3. States whose permanent residents have suffered damage; and
4. a State which belongs to an international intergovernmental organization which has suffered damage and had declared its acceptance of the Convention's rights and obligations.
Liability Convention, supra note 24, arts. VIII, XXII.
"If diplomatic relations are not maintained with the launching State, the claim may be submitted through a third State which does have relations or through the Secretary-General of the
United Nations to the launching State. Liability Convention, supra note 24, art. IX.
"Liability Convention, supra note 24, art. X.
"For a discussion of the problems permeating these negotiations, see Bockstiegel, Arbitration
and Adjudication Regarding Activities in Outer Space, 6 J. SPACE L. 3 (1978).
"Liability Convention, supra note 24, art. XIV.
60Id.
" If there are several claimant or launching States they must collectively agree on single claimant and launching State members. Liability Convention, supra note 24, art.XVII. Otherwise
joinder would become an easy method of packing the Commission.
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together agree' on the third member. 63 The Claims Commission will decide
the merits of the claim and fix the amount of compensation in accordance
with "international law and principles of justice and equity."'6 There is no

ceiling on the amount of damages for which the tortfeasing state(s) can be
held liable.
The Claims Commission's decision is binding if the parties so agree, or
recommendatory in the absence of such an agreement." Under the claim

procedures a victim's remedies are a little uncertain. Since only governments
can present claims," an individual's claim may never be presented or presented in a manner which does not fully detail the harm he suffered, or if
properly presented, compensation maybe seriously compromised in the dip-

lomatic negotiation stage. Should the claim reach the Claims Commission,
there is the problem of applicable law. "International law and principles of
justice and equity"' leaves much to be desired as a discoverable body of law
upon which to adjudicate a claim and fix compensation. Lastly, the probability of a merely recommendatory award may render illusory any remedy the
Convention does provide.
4. SummArY
Thus the Space Shuttle may cause damage or injury without exposing the
United States to any binding legal liability. The combined effect of the
Convention's substantive and procedural weaknesses tend to make a negotiated settlement problematic and to discourage binding awards.
B. Recommendations
There is no means of enforcing Claims Commission decisions, even binding ones.' The only realistic way to improve the situation is to amend the

"If no agreement is reached on the third member four months after the request for the Commission was made, either party may ask the U.N. Secretary-General to appoint the third member. Should a State fail to appoint a member at all, the United Nations appointee would become a
single-member Claims Commission. Liability Convention, supra note 24, arts. XV, XVI.
63Id.
"Liability Convention, supra note 24, arts XII, XVIII. Decisions will be made by majority
vote. Id. art. XVI.
"'The Convention further asks for the awards to be considered in good faith and provides for
the decisions and reasons for the decisions to be made public. Liability Convention, supra note
24, art. XIX.
66Under general principles of international law, a person cannot present a claim in an international forum against his own State. This fact necessitated the nation-centered approach of the
Convention. See, e.g. Vereshchetin, State Sovereignty and Use of Outer Space 15 SOVIET L.
GOV'T 75 (1976).
"Liability Convention, supra note 24, art. XII.
"This shorthand statement greatly oversimplifies the means available to the world community
to secure compliance with international law. See CHRISTOL, supra note 23, at 314-49, for an
excellent discussion of how nations should most intelligently employ a wide variety of available
coercive and noncoercive measures in obtaining compliance with international space law. Dr.
Christol suggests that, under the principle of proportionality, the coerciveness of the means of
enforcement should be an increasing function of the threat to international peace and security
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Liability Convention in such a way as to make compliance in the interest of
the signatories. With this end in mind, two aspects of the Liability Convention are worthy of note.
1.

APPLICABLE LAW

Nations may be hesitant to negotiate a settlement or bind themselves to a
Commission decision when they do not know what body of law the Commission will apply. Article XII gives the following general outline of applicable
law:
The compensation which the launching State shall be liable to pay for damage under
this Convention shall be determined in accordance with international law and the
principles of justice and equity, in order to provide such reparation in respect of the
damage as will restore the person, natural or juridicial, State or international organization on whose behalf the claim is presented to the condition which would
have existed if the damage had not occurred.'
The Convention drafters tried unsuccessfully to agree on a more exact
body of applicable law. 7" However, now that there is a Liability Convention,
article XII should serve as a starting point from which the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nation's Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (COPUOS) could agree on a more exact set of legal rules.
For example, as things now stand, article XII does not say whether, or to
what extent, moral (non-physical) and consequential (indirect) harm is compensable. 7 ' This would be a good starting point, and the content of the rules
developed would be less important than the existence of rules which all signatories have agreed upon.
A liberal body of space tort law is of little utility if it is not observed. It is
more reasonable to expect nations to bind themselves to a Claims Commis-

and/or the threat to the sovereign state. Id. at 345-47. This thesis retains vitality in space liability
law. The effects of noncompliance with Claims Commission decisions upon the peaceful relations existing between a claimant and tortfeasing State can be expected to become increasingly
deleterious as the magnitude of the tort grows.
"Liability Convention, supra note 24, art. XI I. See materials cited in notes 26 and 27 supra for
concepts of compensable damage.
Under this article, Canada will expect the Soviet Union to pay for the cost of returning its
wilderness area to the condition it enjoyed before radio-active fragments were scattered across it
by Cosmos 954. Canada's claim against the Soviets was in the amount of $6,041,174.70 (Canadian) (Communique of the Canadian Department of External Affairs No. 8, January 23, 1979),
and after amendment is certain to exceed 12 million dollars. Finch & Moore, The Cosmos 954
Incident and International Space Law, 65 A.B.A.J. 57 (1979).
"°See, e.g. Foster, supra note 23, at 171-72.
"The current state of scholarly opinion is that the Convention allows claims for harm which is
physical or non-physical and caused either directly or indirectly. However, the less physical and
direct the injury, the less likely the recovery. Thus recovery for loss of consortium, a nonphysical
harm which results indirectly from a tortious act, would seem unlikely. A stronger case may be
made for the pain and suffering which accompanies an injury because the harm has been directly
caused, although its nonphysical nature makes valuation difficult. Similarly, a factory owner
should have little difficulty recovering for the damage a space object caused to his plant. However, a factory employee who lost wages due to the accident has suffered indirect pecuniary
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sion decision when they know what law will be applied, and when they themselves drafted the rules upon which their cause will be decided. Such an innovation would make Commission decisions reasonably predictable, and
parties more willing to negotiate a settlement.
2.

CEILING ON LIABILITY

The Convention places no monetary limit on the amount of a Claims Commission award. Who is going to negotiate a settlement or agree to comply
with a Claims Commission decision on that basis? A monetary ceiling on
damages would allow countries to estimate their exposure to liability and
would strengthen the operation of the Convention. 2
If a ceiling were placed on liability, care should be taken to avoid unjust
results. Should limits be placed on a per accident or per victim basis? A per
victim limit would avoid the unjust result of dozens of injured victims of one
accident having to share an award, the sum of which may have been enjoyed
completely by a sole similarly injured victim in another accident. Should the
limit be a fixed sum or a sum related to the potential danger of the object
launched into space? Although a fixed sum has simplicity in its favor, it
would appear more rational for liability limits (like the insurance premiums
which pay awards) to vary directly with the amount and probability of the
danger.
Whether the monetary limit to liability is fixed or variable, per accident or
per victim, a ceiling will increase the likelihood of voluntary compliance with
Claims Commission decisions and facilitate negotiation of settlements by
providing a boundary within which to negotiate.
C. Effect of a Strengthened Liability Convention
Viewed alone, the proposals for a liability ceiling and a guiding body of
applicable law would seem to reduce the liability of the United States for a
Space Shuttle tort. The ceiling places an upper limit on awards. The body of
law will almost certainly be conservative since it must be a product of compromise between the several legal systems of the members of the United Nations.
However, when the proposed amendments to the Convention are considered in light of their probable effects, American liability exposure is increased. A monetary limit to liability and adoption of a discrete body of
applicable law would enhance the chances of voluntary compliance with
Liability Convention procedures and remedies and would mean that a given
Shuttle tort is more likely to result in an American payment of damages.
harm, and thus has a more difficult chance of obtaining compensation. See notes 26 and 27 and
materials cited therein for further opinions on what wrongs are compensable under the Convention.
"Cf. F. NozAi, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 85 (1973). Nozari feels the lack of a liability ceiling
is an important "plus" of the Convention.
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Specifically, the innovations facilitate negotiated settlements, encourage
payment of recommendatory awards, promote agreements to accept Commission decisions as binding, and increase American exposure to liability for
Shuttle operations.
Conclusion
The Space Shuttle's unique characteristic of reusability, and its ability to
deliver several different payloads into orbit, will increase the number of manmade objects in space. Very small possibilities of accidental harm exist from
jettisoned Shuttle Rocket Boosters, falling fragments of the Shuttle External
Tank, and collisions between objects placed in orbit. However, overall the
Shuttle program decreases the possibilities that space activities will result in
damage or injury, especially in view of the Shuttle's ability to retrieve or alter
the path of space objects in low-earth orbits.
The Liability Convention provides a legal route by which one injured or
damaged by Shuttle operations would present a claim for compensation by
the United States. Deficiencies in the Liability Convention, however, mean
that a Space Shuttle tort does not necessarily expose the United States to any
binding liability.
As a means of strengthening the Liability Convention, proposals were
made to provide incentives for States to comply with Convention procedures
and remedies. The proposals called for a definition of the legal standards
(applicable law) by which tort liability for space activities could be more
precisely determined and for the imposition of a monetary ceiling on liability.
The proposals would theoretically increase American exposure to liability
for accidents involving space vehicles by fostering negotiated settlements of
claims and voluntary compliance with Claims Commission decisions.
The incredible strides mankind has made in space technology have been
accompanied by great steps nations have taken in space law. Now that the
Shuttle will make access to space routine, the Liability Convention should
operate with assured dependability. The proposed changes in the Liability
Convention enhance the certainty of its operation, and hence help keep international space law in pace with new advances in space technology.

